PrepTest 73, Section 4, Question 18
Some critics of advertising have assumed that the creation of false needs in consumers is the principal mechanism underlying what these critics regard as its manipulative and hegemonic power. Central to this type of critique are the writings of political theorist Herbert Marcuse, who maintained that modern people succumb to oppression by believing themselves satisfied in spite of their living in an objectively unsatisfying world. This process occurs because in mass market culture the powerful psychological techniques of advertising create "needs" that are false and whose satisfaction thus contributes, not to the genuine well-being of consumers, but rather to the profit�and thereby the disproportionate power�of corporations.
Marcuse supposed that we all have certain real needs, both physical and psychological. Advertising appropriates these needs for its own purposes, forging psychological associations between them and consumer items, e.g., between sex and perfume, thereby creating a false "need" for these items. Since the quest for fulfillment is thus displaced from its true objects to consumer items, the implicit promises of advertisements are never really fulfilled and the consumer remains at some level unsatisfied.
Unfortunately, the distinction between real and false needs upon which this critique depends is extremely problematic. If Marcusians are right, we cannot, with any assurance, separate our real needs from the alleged false needs we feel as a result of the manipulation of advertisers. For, in order to do so, it would be necessary to eliminate forces of persuasion that are so prevalent in society that they have come to inform our instinctive judgments about things.
But, in fact, Marcusians make a major mistake in assuming that the majority of consumers who respond to advertising do not do so autonomously. Advertising techniques are unable to induce unwilling behavior in rational, informed adults, and regulations prohibit misinformation in advertising claims. Moreover, evidence suggests that most adults understand and recognize the techniques used and are not merely passive instruments. If there is a real need for emotional fulfillment, and if we can freely and authentically choose our means of obtaining it, then free, informed individuals may choose to obtain it through the purchase of commodities or even through the enjoyment occasionally provided by advertisements themselves. It is no doubt true that in many�perhaps even most�cases the use of an advertised product does not yield the precise sort of emotional dividend that advertisements seem to promise. This does not mean, however, that consumers do not freely and intentionally use the product as a means to another sort of fulfillment, or even that its genuine fulfillment of needs must be less than the advertisement suggests.
Some critics of advertising have assumed that the creation of false needs in consumers is the principal mechanism underlying what these critics regard as its manipulative and hegemonic power. Central to this type of critique are the writings of political theorist Herbert Marcuse, who maintained that modern people succumb to oppression by believing themselves satisfied in spite of their living in an objectively unsatisfying world. This process occurs because in mass market culture the powerful psychological techniques of advertising create "needs" that are false and whose satisfaction thus contributes, not to the genuine well-being of consumers, but rather to the profit�and thereby the disproportionate power�of corporations.
Marcuse supposed that we all have certain real needs, both physical and psychological. Advertising appropriates these needs for its own purposes, forging psychological associations between them and consumer items, e.g., between sex and perfume, thereby creating a false "need" for these items. Since the quest for fulfillment is thus displaced from its true objects to consumer items, the implicit promises of advertisements are never really fulfilled and the consumer remains at some level unsatisfied.
Unfortunately, the distinction between real and false needs upon which this critique depends is extremely problematic. If Marcusians are right, we cannot, with any assurance, separate our real needs from the alleged false needs we feel as a result of the manipulation of advertisers. For, in order to do so, it would be necessary to eliminate forces of persuasion that are so prevalent in society that they have come to inform our instinctive judgments about things.
But, in fact, Marcusians make a major mistake in assuming that the majority of consumers who respond to advertising do not do so autonomously. Advertising techniques are unable to induce unwilling behavior in rational, informed adults, and regulations prohibit misinformation in advertising claims. Moreover, evidence suggests that most adults understand and recognize the techniques used and are not merely passive instruments. If there is a real need for emotional fulfillment, and if we can freely and authentically choose our means of obtaining it, then free, informed individuals may choose to obtain it through the purchase of commodities or even through the enjoyment occasionally provided by advertisements themselves. It is no doubt true that in many�perhaps even most�cases the use of an advertised product does not yield the precise sort of emotional dividend that advertisements seem to promise. This does not mean, however, that consumers do not freely and intentionally use the product as a means to another sort of fulfillment, or even that its genuine fulfillment of needs must be less than the advertisement suggests.
Some critics of advertising have assumed that the creation of false needs in consumers is the principal mechanism underlying what these critics regard as its manipulative and hegemonic power. Central to this type of critique are the writings of political theorist Herbert Marcuse, who maintained that modern people succumb to oppression by believing themselves satisfied in spite of their living in an objectively unsatisfying world. This process occurs because in mass market culture the powerful psychological techniques of advertising create "needs" that are false and whose satisfaction thus contributes, not to the genuine well-being of consumers, but rather to the profit�and thereby the disproportionate power�of corporations.
Marcuse supposed that we all have certain real needs, both physical and psychological. Advertising appropriates these needs for its own purposes, forging psychological associations between them and consumer items, e.g., between sex and perfume, thereby creating a false "need" for these items. Since the quest for fulfillment is thus displaced from its true objects to consumer items, the implicit promises of advertisements are never really fulfilled and the consumer remains at some level unsatisfied.
Unfortunately, the distinction between real and false needs upon which this critique depends is extremely problematic. If Marcusians are right, we cannot, with any assurance, separate our real needs from the alleged false needs we feel as a result of the manipulation of advertisers. For, in order to do so, it would be necessary to eliminate forces of persuasion that are so prevalent in society that they have come to inform our instinctive judgments about things.
But, in fact, Marcusians make a major mistake in assuming that the majority of consumers who respond to advertising do not do so autonomously. Advertising techniques are unable to induce unwilling behavior in rational, informed adults, and regulations prohibit misinformation in advertising claims. Moreover, evidence suggests that most adults understand and recognize the techniques used and are not merely passive instruments. If there is a real need for emotional fulfillment, and if we can freely and authentically choose our means of obtaining it, then free, informed individuals may choose to obtain it through the purchase of commodities or even through the enjoyment occasionally provided by advertisements themselves. It is no doubt true that in many�perhaps even most�cases the use of an advertised product does not yield the precise sort of emotional dividend that advertisements seem to promise. This does not mean, however, that consumers do not freely and intentionally use the product as a means to another sort of fulfillment, or even that its genuine fulfillment of needs must be less than the advertisement suggests.
Some critics of advertising have assumed that the creation of false needs in consumers is the principal mechanism underlying what these critics regard as its manipulative and hegemonic power. Central to this type of critique are the writings of political theorist Herbert Marcuse, who maintained that modern people succumb to oppression by believing themselves satisfied in spite of their living in an objectively unsatisfying world. This process occurs because in mass market culture the powerful psychological techniques of advertising create "needs" that are false and whose satisfaction thus contributes, not to the genuine well-being of consumers, but rather to the profit�and thereby the disproportionate power�of corporations.
Marcuse supposed that we all have certain real needs, both physical and psychological. Advertising appropriates these needs for its own purposes, forging psychological associations between them and consumer items, e.g., between sex and perfume, thereby creating a false "need" for these items. Since the quest for fulfillment is thus displaced from its true objects to consumer items, the implicit promises of advertisements are never really fulfilled and the consumer remains at some level unsatisfied.
Unfortunately, the distinction between real and false needs upon which this critique depends is extremely problematic. If Marcusians are right, we cannot, with any assurance, separate our real needs from the alleged false needs we feel as a result of the manipulation of advertisers. For, in order to do so, it would be necessary to eliminate forces of persuasion that are so prevalent in society that they have come to inform our instinctive judgments about things.
But, in fact, Marcusians make a major mistake in assuming that the majority of consumers who respond to advertising do not do so autonomously. Advertising techniques are unable to induce unwilling behavior in rational, informed adults, and regulations prohibit misinformation in advertising claims. Moreover, evidence suggests that most adults understand and recognize the techniques used and are not merely passive instruments. If there is a real need for emotional fulfillment, and if we can freely and authentically choose our means of obtaining it, then free, informed individuals may choose to obtain it through the purchase of commodities or even through the enjoyment occasionally provided by advertisements themselves. It is no doubt true that in many�perhaps even most�cases the use of an advertised product does not yield the precise sort of emotional dividend that advertisements seem to promise. This does not mean, however, that consumers do not freely and intentionally use the product as a means to another sort of fulfillment, or even that its genuine fulfillment of needs must be less than the advertisement suggests.
The main function of the first paragraph is to
summarize the political and economic context from which Marcusian critiques of advertising arise
outline the mechanisms by which false needs originate in mass market culture
evaluate the psychological processes by which the manipulative techniques of mass market advertising influence individuals
describe the prevailing views among contemporary critics of advertising and categorize Marcuse's theories in relation to those views
describe Marcusian views regarding mass market manipulation and indicate their role in certain criticisms of advertising
0 Comments